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I.

INTRODUCTION

Re-conceptualizing contract law in light of its broader context has a
long academic history. Both law and economics, and law and society
scholarship have made important contributions to this end. This article
critically reviews two important contributions to the study of "contract law
in context," namely David Campbell, Hugh Collins, and John Wightman's
Implicit Dimensions of Contract' and Leone Niglia's The Transformationof
Contractin Europe.2 Both works suggest that contract law should no longer
© 2004, Alberto Salazar Valle.
Adjunct Professor of Law and Economics, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The
author wishes to thank Professor lain Ramsay and the editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal for their
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay.
1 David
Campbell, Hugh Collins & John Wightman, eds., ImplicitDimensionsof Contract:Discrete,

Relational, and Network Contracts (Oxford: Hart, 2003) [Implicit Dimensions].
2 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003) [Transformationof Contract].
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remain separated from the context of market transactions. The collection
of articles by Campbell, Collins, and Wightman suggest that contract law
needs to be re-examined with consideration to its implicit dimensions. But
the context of contracts is not just composed of implicit contractual
practices or customs. Contract law may also reflect broader economic,
political, or social choices. This may include the sole pursuit of the
competitiveness of market capitalism: Leone Niglia concludes that several
European contract laws tend to satisfy the needs and values of the market.
Both works further demonstrate that classical contract law is inadequate
and ought to be abandoned.
This article argues that, despite these contributions, the study of
contract law in context urgently needs better descriptive and normative
frameworks that not only illuminate the context of contracts and its
interrelations with contract law but also solve unavoidable contractual
justice problems and determine the values that may guide contract law. The
first section of this article briefly examines the contributions of the two
reviewed books. Both the implicit dimensions project and the evolution of
European contract law are described. In the second section, I critically
assess the central arguments of the books and explore alternative views of
contract law in context. This criticism suggests a different story of the
implicit dimensions of contract that in turn complicates attempts at
understanding the context of contracts. This section concludes with a
preliminary exploration of a communicative institutional view of contract
law in context. In this view, contract law is seen as an output of the
communicative process of contracting individuals and groups, which is
involved in enhancing human rights. The article concludes that the specific
contract law implications and empirical basis of this approach remain a
challenge for future research.
II.

CONTRACT LAW IN CONTEXT

A.

The Implicit Dimensions of Contracts

Both of the reviewed works suggest that contract law should no longer
remain separated from the context of market transactions. Classical
contract law is being and ought to be abandoned. Instead, contract law
should be interpreted and enforced in light of its context. The collection of
works edited by Campbell, Collins, and Wightman suggests that contract
law should recognize and respect the implicit dimensions of contracts.
These include non-legal sanctions, customs, trust, cooperative practices,
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expectations, 3 and conventions of meaning in language.4 The authors
defend this view from different angles and find implicit dimensions of
contract in several areas such as consumer, commercial, and corporate
relations.
Several articles in the book defend the significance of the implicit
dimensions of contract from a more general perspective. Recognizing that
the formal approach to contracts may have some merit, Stewart Macaulay
suggests that the legal system may lose its legitimacy if it ignores the
implicit dimensions of contracts and rejects the "real deal" of the parties.5
Respecting this real dimension of contracts may help settle disputes in a
manner that satisfies the expectations of both parties. Roger Brownsword
argues that courts may need an ethical theory of contract to guide the
determination, recognition, and protection of implicit dimensions of
contracts.6 Taking a contextualist approach, Brownsword suggests that in
interpreting contracts the real debate is about the role played by normative
standards of fairness. Recognizing that the "reasonable expectations" of the
parties can be based on the interpretation of different factors such as
conventions, business practices, and objective standards, he claims that the
law can develop objective standards based on a Kantian theory of moral
entitlements. These standards would establish basic principles of
contracting, such as truth-telling and promise-keeping, that all contracting
parties should respect.
The concept of relational contracts has shown that written contracts
are relative and that non-written aspects of contracts are critical for a
successful market exchange. The theory of relational contracts shows that
trust, cooperation, and incomplete obligations are central features of
contracts. Ian R. Macneil argues that a good understanding of contracts
requires starting the analysis by examining the context and giving serious
consideration to all relational elements.' Renaming his relational contract
theory "essential contract theory," Macneil argues that this approach
compels those attempting to understand contracts to consider elements of
power, solidarity, reciprocity, and harmonization with the social matrix. He
3 Implicit Dimensions,supra note

1 at 7-9.

4 Ibid. at 49.

5"The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the
Urge
for Transparent Simple Rules" in Implicit Dimensions,supra note 1 at 51.
6 "After Investors: Interpretation, Expectation and the Implicit Dimension of the 'New
Contextualism"' in Implicit Dimensions, supra note 1 at 103.
7 "Reflections on Relational Contract Theory after a Neo-classical Seminar" in Implicit
Dimensions,supra note 1 at 207.
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claims that such relational theory is relatively neutral and incomplete.
William C. Whitford hypothesizes that, unlike their British counterparts,
courts in the United States tend to exercise their discretion to fill gaps in
the understandings of parties to contracts.8 It is argued that the nonresponsiveness of the American legislative process to contract law issues
and thus the need for judicial activism may mainly account for such
difference in the use of judicial discretion. This argument shows that the
ability to change written contracts to favour some implicit aspects of
contracts may be an expression of the governing power of courts.
Another group of articles find implicit dimensions in consumer and
commercial contracts. John Wightman argues that the unilateral
expectations of consumers should be given greater weight in interpreting
standard form contracts where customary implicit understandings and joint
understandings are absent, as no contracting community exists to foster
such shared understandings. 9 Wightman maintains that one important
reason for this argument is that the suppliers often shape consumer
expectations by providing the informational context. Hugh Collins claims
that the protection of the reasonable expectations of contractual parties is
based on the economic and relational dimensions of contracts.' ° This in
turn constitutes the basis for regulating the discretionary power of contract
parties. Following his social system theory, Gunther Teubner suggests that
expert liability towards third parties is an implicit dimension of contracting
that arises from the binding of expertise contract to project contract." This
third party liability emerges between parties that have no explicit
contractual ties but participate in the same contractual network. This
implicit dimension has its origin in the embeddedness of contract in a
variety of social institutions. Third parties are then internalized into the
contract. Drawing on this approach, Teubner claims that experts have a
direct responsibility to third parties. In this way, all expectations in the
contractual network are respected and protected against incompetence and
fraud by liability rules.
The idea of implicit dimensions of contracts is taken farther in several
articles that explore corporate governance issues. The authors argue that
8,,A Comparison of British and American Attitudes Towards the Exercise of Judicial Discretion
in Contract Law" in Implicit Dimensions, supra note 1 at 187.
9"Beyond Custom: Contract, Contexts, and the Recognition of Implicit Understandings" in
Implicit Dimensions,supra note 1 at 143.
J0"Discretionary Powers in Contracts" in Implicit Dimensions, supra note 1 at 219.
"Expertise as Social Institution: Internalising Third Parties into the Contract" in Implicit
Dimensions, supra note 1 at 333.
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implicit dimensions exist in corporate governance, shedding light on several
problematic issues. The last portion of Implicit Dimensions is devoted to
articulating this view. Paddy Ireland argues that contract theories of
corporations have been used to justify the efficiency of corporate structure,
ignoring the implicit expectations of important stakeholders such as
employees and, more generally, neglecting the relational and network
aspects of firms.' 2 Simon Deakin, Richard Hobbs, David Nash, and Giles
Slinger claim that corporate takeovers breach the implicit contracts
between corporations and non-shareholder constituencies, such as
employees and communities, as the short-term financial interest of
shareholders is the main objective sought in takeovers. 3 Their empirical
study suggests that takeovers often cause redundancies and expropriation.
This may create disincentives for employees, suppliers, and communities at
large to invest in human capital and engage in innovation. This, ultimately,
will risk the long-term success of productive enterprise and bring significant
costs to society. From this view, the concept of implicit dimensions of
contract suggests a progressive perspective of corporate governance that
most traditional approaches have underestimated. Christopher Riley
discusses the UK courts' changing stance on the implicit dimensions of
contracts between shareholders in small, private companies. 14 He finds that
the courts have been recently denying force to the parties' informal
agreements, implicit terms, and expectations, and have insisted on giving
greater recognition to the shareholders' express agreements. Riley claims
that this is a judicial retreat that may reflect the courts' reaction to concerns
associated with the economic account of inter-shareholder contracting such
as mounting litigation cost.
The fundamental message is that scholars and practitioners should
take into account the context of contract law, and consequently, contract
law itself needs to be reformulated in light of this context. While this
approach has its merits, the claim that implicit dimensions of contract
should be respected is to some extent another way of claiming that contract
law should be responsive to the real needs of the market. This view is
clearly adopted by several European countries where contract law is being
reinterpreted to meet the needs of building efficient or fairer markets. In
The Transformation of Contract in Europe, Leone Niglia explores these
12"Recontractualising the Corporation: Implicit Contract as Ideology"
in Implicit Dimensions,
supra note 1 at 255.
13"Implicit Contracts, Takeovers and Corporate Governance: In the Shadow
of the City Code"
in Implicit Dimensions, supra note 1 at 289.
14,"Implicit Dimensions of Contract and the Oppression of Minority Shareholders"
in Implicit
Dimensions, supra note 1 at 365.
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developments from a historical perspective.
B.

ContractLaw in the EuropeanMarket Context

Leone Niglia finds that modern European contract law, particularly
consumer law, tends to satisfy the needs and values of the market.
Consumer protection law no longer applies general protective rules.
Instead, it is now meeting the demands of efficient markets in the belief
that this will ultimately make consumers better off. Consequently,
European contract law is becoming a cluster of policy-oriented
discretionary choices that explicitly promote market competitiveness. 5 This
transformation is termed "market factor-based" contract law. Niglia argues
that this change represents a departure from the rule-based treatment of
standard form contracts that characterized European countries during the
twentieth century and prevailed until the 1990s. Under the rule-based
contract law regime, all European courts and legislatures would identify a
number of standardized consumer terms and assess the validity of them in
the abstract without significant reference to the social context or the market
system. However, since the 1990s, and unlike the old rule-based consumer
protection policies, 16 the rights and obligations of consumers are now
largely being shaped by the demands of efficient markets. For instance, the
same "penalty" or "exemption clause" may be held unfair in some cases and
fair in other cases depending on the conditions and objectives associated
with market competitiveness (for example, "whether harsh terms entail a
reduction in price to the advantage of consumers") and largely regardless
of existing abstract legal rules. 7 Niglia argues that England and Italy are
clearly committed to this project but that this new trend has found some
resistance in countries such as France and Germany where the "contract
law of 'rules' remains in operation."' 8
Niglia discusses this trend in the context of the 1993 European
Community Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts, a model of
contract law aimed at promoting the competitiveness of internal markets.1 9
The focus is on "the law of standard form contracts" that is central both to

15 Transformation of Contract, supra note 2 at 149, 206 (regarding the
UK).
16 Ibid.
1 7

18
19

Ibid. at4.

Ibid. at 149.
Ibid. at 4. 150.
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the history of contract law in Europe and to the reviewed book.20 The
author shows that countries with market-oriented consumer protection laws
and deregulatory policies have welcomed and implemented the Directive.
This is the case in England and Italy; 2' however, these countries have taken
different routes in pursuing market-oriented consumer policies. Whereas
England has relaxed its old consumer protectionist standards and
deregulated contract law in an attempt to promote the competitiveness of
its market, Italy is attempting to accomplish this same goal by implementing
some forms of legal interventionism in the economy. Unlike these
countries, Germany and France have pursued more interventionist policies
towards their markets and have been resistant to the Directive's precepts.
While France has defended the role of the state as a central economic actor
and placed faith in the state economic power, Germany has supported the
idea of state regulatory power and defended the need to discipline private
market power.2 Niglia claims that it is these social and political projects
(associated with different beliefs on the role of the market), rather than
abstract legal narratives, that explain the different consumer protection
policies in Europe.
The author claims that the debate about rule-based versus market
factors-based consumer protection laws is ideological and impractical. The
author notes that decision makers in each country may be faced with the
real challenge of meeting the true needs and aspirations of their citizens,
and may thus need to make choices that depart from their adopted
consumer protection projects in an attempt to serve the public interest.23
This need to serve the public interest seems to be a call for a legal,
economic, and political assessment of consumer protection laws in Europe
to determine how these laws may contribute to improving the well-being of
citizens. It also poses a challenge to traditional legal narratives and the legal
elite, asking whether and how the public interest should be pursued.
Niglia demonstrates that contract law can no longer be viewed
separately from broader social, political, and economic contexts. Macro
social choices may provide the content and directions of contract law, which
is open to the changing influence of its macro market context. A selfreferential contract law is thus misleading. This is the new form in which
contract law links with society in Europe.

20 Ibid. at

2.

21 Ibid. at 149-50.

22 Ibid1
23 Ibid. at 150, 227-28.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

III.

THE CONTEXT OF CONTRACT LAW

A.

The Other Implicit Dimensionsof ContractLaw
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While the reviewed works make important contributions towards
developing an account of contract law embedded in its social context, a
richer view of this context is needed. The idea of implicit dimensions of
contract seems to be grounded on a neoclassical-friendly view of
contractual relations, which is to say that several important social
dimensions of contracts and market exchange are not given significant
attention. A race-less, sexless, classless, and largely cooperative marketworld dictates the rights and obligations of contractual relations through
the notion of "implicit dimensions." References to other implicit
dimensions of contract law-associated with race, class, gender, ethnicity,
and power relations-are largely absent. These elements do not appear
significantly, either in the implicit dimensions of contracts or in the account
of the evolution of European contract law. While purporting to take the
real context of contracts seriously, there seems to be an over-concentration
on the inadequacies of contract legal rules in Campbell, Collins, and
Wightman's book 24 and an over-emphasis on the macro socio-political
context of contracts in Niglia's book.
Implicit dimensions of contract cannot only be comprised of
neglected reasonable expectations of contractual parties, implicit
understandings, or unspoken obligations of loyalty. 25 Race, class, gender,
ethnicity, power, and broader political projects also influence the design
and enforcement of contract law. For instance, the ethnic identity of
contractual parties may determine the scope of contractual trust and

24 This is even noticed by one of the authors. See Macneil, supra note 7 at 210, noting that "[m]ost
of the papers and comments seemed to take as their starting point: Dimensions of Contracts Implicit
in express terms. (Stewart Macaulay's paper was the clearest and most complete exception; John
Wightman's went almost, but not quite, as far, if I understand his paper correctly). Thus, even in such
an enlightened group there was a strong tendency to start thinking about any contract with its express
terms. ... the express terms cannot be the beginning and end of our analysis" and claiming that "[sitarting
with the express terms and the classical contract approach almost invariably skews the analysis of the
circumstances in which they are embedded"(ibid. at 211). One of the articles that arguably shows such
over-concentration in contract legal rules as opposed to a deep understanding of the context of contracts
is David Campbell & Hugh Collins, "Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts" in Implicit
Dimensions, supra note 1 at 25ff.
25 See e.g. Hugh Collins, "Introduction" in Implicit Dimensions, supra note 1 at 23.
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26 Shared
cooperation and often mould parties' reasonable expectations. 21

identity may facilitate trust, cooperation, and relational contracting, and
may give content to the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. But

differences in race, class, gender, or ethnicity may also create
discrimination problems in commercial transactions. Racial and gender
considerations may indeed lead to changes in the terms and conditions of

contracts so as to discriminate against disadvantaged groups.27 Ignoring
these other implicit dimensions of contract may be detrimental to a more
accurate description of the broader context of contracts. Making

abstractions of some important aspects of the context of contracts may
misguide the project of re-formulating contract law in light of its context,
causing it to yield only a modest agenda. It should not come as a surprise

that the practice and theory of contractual justice are not central in the
reviewed books, and the commitment to normative ideas or values
associated with contractual justice is modest.28
Nevertheless, Niglia's book contributes to broadening the view of the

context of contract law in a very important respect. Unlike the micro
implicit dimensions project, he shows that political and economic context
does account for the content and objectives of contract law. 29 This suggests
26

See e.g. Mark Granovetter, "Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for

Analysis" (1992) 35 Acta Sociologica 3 at 7; Izhak Schnell & Michael Sofer, "Embedding
Entrepreneurship in Social Structure: Israeli-Arab Entrepreneurship" (2003) 27.2 Int'l J. Urban &
Regional Research 300 at 302. The relevance of ethnicity for the study of contractingwas earlier noticed
by Amartya Sen. See Amartya Sen, "Goals, Commitment and Identity" (1985) 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 341.
27
See e.g. Ian Ayres, "Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations"
(1991) 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817; Ian Ayres, "Is Discrimination Elusive?"(2003) 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2419; Ian
Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice?: Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2001); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, "Race and Gender Discrimination
in Negotiation for the Purchase of a New Car" (1995) 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 304; and Ian Ayres, "Further
Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of its Cause" (1995) 94 Mich. L.
Rev. 109. See also lain Ramsay & Toni Williams, "Inequality, Market Discrimination, and Credit
Markets" in lain Ramsay, ed., Consumer Law in the Global Economy: National and International
Dimensions (Aldershot: Ashgate and Dartmouth, 1997); Peter Siegelman, "Racial Discrimination in
'Everyday' Commercial Transactions: What Do We Know, What Do We Need to Know, and How Can
We Find Out?" in Michael Fix & Margery Turner, eds.,A NationalReport Card on Discriminationin
America: TheRole of Testing (The Urban Institute, 1999); and John Yinger, "Evidence of Discrimination
in Consumer Markets" (1998) 12 J. Econ. Perspectives 23. For an analysis of racial discrimination in the
UK see e.g. John Solomos, Race andRacism in Britain, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1993).
28 This is particularly true for Campbell, Collins, & Wightman's book. See Collins, supra note 25
at 23. An exception to this non-central place of contractual justice seems to be Deakin et al., supra note
13.
29 There are modest references to the macro implicit dimensions of contract in Implicit
Dimensions, supra note 1. See e.g. Macneil, supra note 7 at 214 (claiming that a relational analysis of
contract law needs to take account of some form of harmonization of contracts with the social matrixsupra contract behaviour and norms).
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a view of contract law embedded not only in its micro implicit relations but
also in the macro political, economic, and social relations that reflect
society's choices and, in turn, further explain the development of contract
law. Contract law thus reflects broader political, economic, and social
choices. For instance, if a society makes the choice of disciplining private
market power, rule-based consumer protection laws-rather than a marketoriented consumer protection project-may be both instrumental to and
reflective of this objective. These macro implicit dimensions are critical in
understanding the context of contract law.
All these other implicit dimensions complicate our understanding of
the context of contract law, creating uncertainty as to whether the law can
respond to such a complex context. Furthermore, contract law is now faced
with the challenge of both solving large contractual justice problems and
determining the values and welfare criteria that will guide the choice of
contract legal rules. Niglia notes this problem towards the end of his book
in his normative reflections. He articulates it by subjecting alternative
contract law projects to a public interest assessment. In evaluating and
making choices regarding contract regulation, an assessment of the public
interest should ascertain whether the well-being of citizens is being
improved. Niglia claims that this issue is critical and that a better analytical
framework is needed. He argues that moving forward requires the
abandonment of abstracted views of the law. However, beyond this, no
clear solutions are offered. An evaluation of the extent to which these
different consumer protection projects serve the public interest may require
an assessment of the welfare effects of such projects, not just theoretically,
but empirically.
Thus, the study of the embeddedness of contract law in its complex
context is largely an unfinished and contentious project.3 ° Indeed, how the
context of contract law and the relationship between contract law and its
context are understood is still problematic.3 This is one of the central
problems with the reviewed books. Their view of the context of contract law
is biased towards the framework employed to describe such a context. For
each theoretical framework of contracts and markets, different sets of
features of contract relations can be captured accordingly. For instance,
from one perspective trust and cooperation may not be the only aspects of
market transactions. Drawing on another framework, power and
30 This is even recognized by Campbell and Collins. See David Campbell & Hugh Collins,
"Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts" in Implicit Dimensions, supra note 1 at 49.
31 This is somewhat recognized. See Collins, supra note 25 at 19 (noting the "need for strategies
to understand the context of contracts" or the implicit dimensions of contract).
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discrimination associated with differences and asymmetries of wealth, race,
class, gender, and ethnicity may also be relevant for contract law analysis.
Thus, contract law can be contextualized in many ways and, depending on
the empirical basis, the accuracy, or the comprehensiveness of the
framework being employed, contract law can also be de-contextualized so
that a mental construction may provide the alleged "reality" of contracts.32
Even more problematic is the attempt to formulate normative values and
goals for contract law.
Therefore, there is an urgent need to explore descriptive and
normative frameworks that can help us better understand and use contract
law in context. This is a gap in the enterprise of studying contracts in
context that the reviewed books to some extent recognize but provide no
clear solutions. 3 In the next section, some ideas are suggested in an attempt
to enrich the debate on this matter.
B.

Exploring a Communicative Institutional View

Adopting a communicative institutional view of contract law may
enrich the study of contract law in context in several important ways. In this
approach, contract law is no longer understood as a set of legal rules of
contracting that simply responds to and reflects its implicit social
dimensions. Instead, contract law is the output of the communicative
process of individuals and groups contracting under the constraints of legal
rules and other social orders or rationalities.34 Initially, contract law
establishes and regulates the constitutionalorgroundrules of contracting.35
But the social embeddedness of these rules show that they are also in
32 This criticism logically disagrees with Macneil's claim that his relational contract theory is
neutral. See Macneil, supra note 7 at 217 (concluding that his "[e]ssential contract theory, one of
countless possible relational theories of contract, is a neutral analytical tool, not one oriented towards
particular social views").
33 See e.g. Campbell & Collins, supra note 30
at 49.
34

See generally Jiurgen Habermas, Between Facts andNorms: Contributionsto a Discourse
Theory

of Law and Democracy,trans. by William Rehg (Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998); Kenneth L.
Avio, "Three Problems of Social Organisation: Institutional Law and Economics Meets Habermasian
Law and Democracy" (2002) 26 Cambridge J. Econ. 501.
35 This point builds on the contributions of German Ordoliberalism, American old
institutionalism, and institutional law and economics scholars. These diverse schools of legal thought
have independently noted the significance of ground rules. See e.g. Agnes Labrousse & Jean-Daniel
Weisz, eds., InstitutionalEconomics in Franceand Germany: German Ordoliberalismversus the French
Regulation School (Berlin: Springer, 2001); lain Ramsay, "Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice
and the Welfare State" (1995) 15 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 177. Macneil somewhat recognizes this insight.
See Macneil, supra note 7 at 215.
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constant communication, not only with other legal rules within the legal
system (for example, legal constitutions), but also with other contracting
discourses and practices arising from the economic, social, cultural, and
political orders.36 These combined ground rules and their modifications
establish the starting and evolving rights of contractual stakeholders. This
communicative process is, however, activated and shaped only by the action
of individuals, groups, and elites involved in contracting. These socialized
actors37 construct and materialize the nature and objectives of both the
broad ground rules of contracting and their modifications. The assignment
and use of contractual and property legal rights do not live in a vacuum. It
is through this communicative process between contracting individuals and
groups that the weighing of multiple interests and values of contracting
takes place. For instance, individuals and groups determine the extent to
which a pattern of contract ground rules and their modifications enhance
efficiency, equity, or distributional objectives under the constraints of the
social orders of contracting. The establishment and modifications
of ground
38
rules do not alone produce the desired effects or objectives.
Yet, the ability of individuals and groups to make decisions;
negotiate, network, plan, and implement a plan of action; use and convert
their legal rights into actual benefits; articulate, translate, and communicate
their interest and values; and the like, is often taken for granted by contract
law. The best efforts to break from these assumptions have concentrated on
questioning the rationality assumptions of both the neoclassical economic
analysis of contracts and classical contract law. But this problem cannot be
reduced simply to the difficulties in making rational decisions. The
communicative process of contracting orders reveals that contracting
individuals and groups hold some form of power and display differences in
gender, class, race, ethnicity, human capabilities, and commodity holdings
ranging from wealth to legal rights. These differences empower or
disempower contracting parties, creating unavoidable contractual justice
36 This point was raised early in the twentieth century by German Ordoliberals who viewed
contract law as an important component of the broad institutional constitution of markets and as
embedded in interpenetrated economic and non-economic orders. As such, contract law institutionally
constitutes markets and sets its ground rules that in turn can be regulated to ensure greater freedom
and protection from abuse of power. See e.g. Labrousse & Weisz, ibid.
37
Socialized actors indicate that individuals and groups are also shaped by the communicative
process of contracting.
38 This problem is largely ignored by German Ordoliberalism, American old institutional
economics, and institutional legal scholars. It draws on Sen's capability approach and his critique of the
commodity holding paradigm of market capitalism. From this perspective, the holding of contractual
rights does not necessarily make the holder better off. See e.g. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
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problems in the communicative process.
These broad human abilities orfreedoms are so critical that neither
markets nor contract law and the communicative process of contracting can
be made possible without them. Besides the instrumental or consequential
value of these freedoms, contractual parties and stakeholders also find
intrinsic value in enjoying their freedom to, for instance, negotiate
contractual terms or decide the use of their commodities. Similarly, human
freedoms may also enable individuals and groups involved in the
communicative process of contracting to construct and communicate their
own values and priorities such as profit maximization, contractual fairness,
a commitment to a healthy environment, or combinations thereof. These
consequential, intrinsic, and constructive roles of freedoms thus make them
a necessity ubiquitous to contract law and the communicative process of
39
contracting.
Contract law, by taking such freedoms as given, is involved in
legalizing existing social arrangements regardless of the fact that these may
be unequally or heterogeneously configured. Contract law, along with
human rights legislation, inescapably permits or prohibits the existence of
certain human conditions as the basis for the operation of markets and for
contracting in particular. If these human abilities or freedoms are
translated into legal rights 4° as a natural result of the communicative
process, it may be argued that-in fact-contract law and the
communicative process of contracting operate on the basis of the presence
of some implicit human rights ground rules. Contract law may do little to
modify or improve these human rights rules despite their intrinsic,
instrumental, and constructive values. A communicative institutional view
contends that contract law is involved in the creation and modification of
contractual and human rights ground rules, and that the protection of such
rights or freedoms is a necessity.
It is through the communicative action of contracting individuals and
groups that normative ideas are also advanced. Individuals and groups
communicate their values and interests associated with their contractual
practices under the constraints of contractual or human rights ground rules
and their modifications. Furthermore, contracting individuals and groups
use, mould, and are shaped by these ground rules of the legal order, and are
in constant communication with the discourses and practices of the other
39 This idea draws on Sen. See Sen, ibid. at 246. Habermas also notes the essential role
of rights
in modem society and the need for a better understanding of the law. See Habermas, supra note 34 at
82ff.
40 Sen, ibid.
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social orders of contracting. Through this communicative process,
contracting individuals and groups weigh and implement competing values,
interests, discourses, and practices involved in contracting. By setting and
modifying ground rules, contract law should facilitate this communicative
process of weighing and implementing multiple values and interests,
including those associated with contractual justice. Moreover, given the
intrinsic, consequential, and constructive significance of human freedoms
for the communicative process, contract law should also seek to enhance
such freedoms.41 It may do so by adopting human rights as constraints and
goals of contracting activities.4 2
A central implication of this view is the rejection of economic
imperialismsin the study of contract law in context. It requires that contract
law and its communicative process not be reduced to merely satisfying the
demands of the economic order, that is to say, to solely maximize utilities
or profits as Pareto efficiency principles suggest. This economic
imperialism, or the attempt to prioritise the economic discourse of
contracting with Pareto efficiency, at the heart of it, is not only unviable but
also undesirable. Pareto efficiency goals are unrealizable not just due to
their internalinconsistencies, 43 but also because of their external incapacity
to appreciate and intercommunicate with other non-economic contractual
discourses and practices, including the ground legal rules and competing
values and interests emerging from the intercommunication of social orders
of contracting. These internal inconsistencies and external inadequacies of
Pareto efficiency principles are largely neglected in Hugh Collins's Paretobased reflexive or implicit contract approach,' and underestimated in Alan
41 This idea is increasingly gaining support. See e.g. Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez,
Human Rights in PrivateLaw (Oxford: Hart, 2001).
42 This draws on Sen's goal-rights system. See Sen, supra note 38 at 212, arguing that this view of
rights "shares with utilitarianism a consequentialist approach (but differs from it in not confining
attention to utility consequences only), and it shares with a libertarian system the attachment of intrinsic
importance to rights (but differs from it in not giving it complete priority irrespective of other
consequences)."
This refers to the economic critique that has questioned the Pareto welfare principles with
economic arguments and from an economic perspective. This internal criticism has largely concentrated
on demonstrating that Pareto efficiency is impossible due to its unrealistic behavioural conditions (the
assumed ability and desire to maximize utilities or profits and the violation of individual autonomy),
traditional market failures (externalities, imperfect information, and monopoly power), the initial or
existing distribution of social resources, the presence of transaction costs and the significance of
institutions, and the inadequacy of adopting the view of welfare as commodity holding. Perhaps Sen has
best articulated this economic critique of Pareto efficiency. See Sen, supra note 38 at 116-119.
44
Collins, supra note 25 at 14 (arguing that the incapacity of contract law to appreciate the implicit
dimensions of contracts "harms through inept legal regulation the goal of facilitating voluntary
transactions that lead to Pareto optimal outcomes"). See also Hugh Collins, RegulatingContracts(New
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Schwartz's economic-oriented formalism.4 5 Moreover, powerful contracting
parties may manipulate the communicative process to impose profitmaximization goals despite the seemingly semi-autonomous legal system.
Teubner's systems theory seems to underestimate this form of forced
economic imperialism.'
The significance of a communicative institutional view may be
illustrated with the English case Barclays'Bankplcv. O'Brien.47 A wife had
charged the matrimonial home to secure her husband's business debts. The
House of Lords prevented the bank from enforcing the charge on the
grounds that the bank knew both that the husband may have unduly
influenced his wife and that the transaction was not beneficial to the wife
and failed to provide the wife with independent legal advice." Lord
Browne-Wilkinson notes the presence of several contracting parties (the
husband, the wife, and the bank) and their embeddedness in several
relationships (marriage, business, and lending).
Each contracting actor in Barclays' Bank holds and communicates
several concurrent contractual values and interests. All seem to be
interested in profiting or obtaining an economic benefit from the lending
relation. It may be plausible to think that the wife and husband may also be
interested in supporting each other, strengthening their marriage,
maintaining their matrimonial home if possible, increasing their access to
credit and their credit worthiness, and probably implementing a work or
vocational project. On the other hand, the bank may also be interested in
developing trust, a long-lasting and cooperative business relation,
expanding its network of borrowers, promoting the flow of capital, and
increasing its reputation. Although these contractual considerations are not
explicitly articulated in Barclays' Bank, it is plausible to think that
contractual actors may consider such contractual rationalities when

York: Oxford University Press, 1999); David Campbell, "Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modern Law
of Contract" (2000) 20 Oxford J. of Legal Stud. 477 at 490-91 (reviewing Collins' Regulating Contracts,
Campbell claims that Collins "fails to engage with the full implications of the pursuit of the best concept
of economic efficiency, Pareto optimality," and notes a contradiction between the Pareto source of the
reflexive capacity of private law that requires no goals and the demand for political goals of his
approach). It must be noted that Collins' contract approach largely draws on Teubner's social system
theory (Collins, Regulating Contracts, ibid.).
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, "Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law" (2003)
113 Yale L.J. 541 at 556 (arguing that "contract law of commercial parties is about efficiency").
46 Marcelo Neves, "From the Autopoiesis to the Allopoiesis of Law" (2001) 28 J.L. & Soc'y 242.
47 (1993), [1994] 1 A.C. 180 (H.L.) [Barclays'Bank].
48 Cited in Olha Cherednychenko, "The Constitutionalization of Contract Law: Something New
Under the Sun?" (2004) 8 E.J.C.L. 1.
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participating in the contractual relation. With important differences, the
wife, the husband, and the bank also articulate and communicate what they
perceive as their contractual legal rights on the basis of their existing human
freedoms and implicit human rights ground rules. In sum, they participate
in different contracting orders and communicate interpenetrated
contractual discourses and practices.
But individuals and groups do not simply follow and submit to these
contractual rationalities as Teubner and Collins seem to suggest. Drawing
on their advantages, they also exploit the communicative process to
advance their goals. In Barclays' Bank, the husband may have
misrepresented and unduly influenced his wife (who probably placed too
much trust in him and was not well informed). On the other hand, the bank,
enjoying greater abilities and freedoms than the wife, may have known
about the husband's undue influence and taken advantage of the situation
by drawing on its existing (ground) right not to inform." The diverse
contracting orders may contain opportunities or disadvantages, including
contractual and human rights ground rules, that actors may take advantage
of through the communicative process. Lord Browne-Wilkinson is receptive
to some aspects of this problematic reality and, in the language of the
communicative institutional approach, recognizes that contract law should
balance the needs and values of such intercommunicated contracting actors
and interpenetrated contracting orders:
The number of recent cases in this field shows that in practice many wives are still subjected
to, and yield to, undue influence by their husbands. Such wives can reasonably look to the law
for some protection when their husbands have abused the trust and confidence reposed in
them.

It is easy to allow sympathy for the wife who is threatened with the loss of her home at the
suit of a rich bank to obscure an important public interest, viz. the need to ensure that the
wealth currently tied to in the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile. If
the rights secured to wives by the law renders vulnerable loans granted on the security of
matrimonial homes, institutions will be unwilling to accept such security, thereby reducing
the flow of capital to business enterprises. It is therefore essential that a law designed to
protect the vulnerable does not render the matrimonial home unacceptable as security to
financial institutions.50

50 Smith v. Hughes (1871), L.R. 6 Q.B. 597 at 607 (cited in Cherednychenko, ibid. at 14, n. 41).
50

Barclays'Bank, supra note 47 at 188 (quoted in Cherednychenko, supra note 48 at 13-14).
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Moreover, this judgment establishes a new "general duty to inform,"
which changes the existing ground contractual legal rights.5 Not only is the
structure of contractual power altered through this modification of the
ground rules, but the wife's right to autonomy, free will, dignity, and
perhaps to a sound family life are protected and advanced.5 2 Thus, such
modification of ground contractual rights may also modify and enhance
existing and implicit human rights ground rules in the sense suggested
above. While facilitating the communication and balancing of contracting
stakeholders' competing values and needs, courts will have to make a
normative decision whether to maintain or expand existing arrangements
of human freedoms or rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The two books reviewed in this article contribute to the broadening
of our understanding of contract law in its social context. The collection of
articles edited by David Campbell, Hugh Collins, and John Wightman
suggest that modern contract law needs to take into account several forms
of implicit contractual rights and obligations arising from the context of
contracts. The authors find implicit dimensions of contracts in consumer,
commercial, and corporate relations. The broader political and economic
context may also influence the development of contract law. Leone Niglia
finds that in Europe contract law has already been re-formulated to serve
broader political and economic choices associated with the role of markets.
Niglia discusses this trend, focusing on the different reactions to the
European Community Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts.
Both books further demonstrate the failures of classical contract law and
show that contract law ought to be understood in light of its social context.
While these works make important contributions towards a view of
contract law embedded in its social context, further progress needs to be
made. The idea of implicit dimensions of contract seems to be grounded on
a neoclassical-friendly idea of contractual relations. A race-less, sexless,
classless, and largely cooperative market world dictates the rights and
obligations of contractual relations through the notion of "implicit
51Cherednychenko, supra note 48 at 14 [emphasis added].
52A French case also illustrates this point. An employee, under a term of the
employment
contract, was asked to move and live in another region of France away from his family. The employee
was dismissed for refusing to comply. The Court of Cassation ruled that the employers were obliged to
respect employee's right to respect for his family life under art. 8 of the Convention (cited in Anthony
Lester & David Pannick, "The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private Law: the Knight's
Move"(2000) 116 Law Q. Rev. 380 at 384).
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dimensions." However, implicit dimensions of contract cannot only be
comprised of neglected reasonable expectations of contractual parties. The
study of contract law in context thus has an urgent need for better
descriptive and normative frameworks that not only illuminate the context
and its interrelations with contract law but also solve unavoidable
contractual justice problems.
This article also explored the advantages of adopting a communicative
institutionalview of contract law in context. From this perspective, contract
law can no longer be seen as a set of legal rules of contracting that simply
responds to and reflects its social context. Instead, it is the output of the
communicative process of individuals and groups contracting under the
constraints of legal rules and other social orders or rationalities. These
rules involve constitutional or ground legal rules associated with contracting
and human rights that in turn are set and modified by contract law and its
interaction with the broader institutional environment. Given the
instrumental, intrinsic, and constructive values of the freedoms associated
with this broad idea of human rights and their social imperative, contract
law should enhance these freedoms and be sensitive to contractual justice
problems. Specific contract law implications and the empirical basis of this
view remain a challenge for future research.

